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 PRICING-TO-MARKET: PRICE DISCRIMINATION
 OR PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION?
 NATHALIE LAVOIE AND QIHONG LIU
 We employ a vertical differentiation model to examine the potential bias in pricing-to-market results
 when using export unit values aggregating differentiated products. Our results show that: (i) false
 evidence of pricing-to-market is always found when using unit values, whether the law of one price
 holds or not; and (ii) the size of the bias increases with the level of product differentiation. Our
 simulation results support those conceptual findings. Thus, some of the positive pricing-to-market
 results in the literature could be an artifact of the product heterogeneity embodied in unit values
 rather than evidence of imperfect competition.
 Key words: price discrimination, pricing-to-market, quality upgrading, unit values, vertical differen-
 tiation.
 Movements in exchange rates can have an
 important influence on an imperfectly com-
 petitive exporter's pricing behavior. Exchange
 rates create a wedge between the price set
 by the exporter and the price paid by the
 importer, and can be used as an instrument
 of price discrimination. The idea that an ex-
 porter can adjust destination-specific markups
 to accommodate changes in exchange rates
 was first documented in Dunn (1970) and
 Mann (1986) and later was termed "pricing-to-
 market" (PTM) by Krugman (1987). Knetter
 (1989) developed an empirical model to ana-
 lyze the presence of PTM. Knetter's model has
 since been used extensively, due to its simplic-
 ity and data availability, to determine the pres-
 ence of price discrimination in international
 trade. This approach has been particularly
 popular in the study of food and agricultural
 exports (e.g., Pick and Park 1991; Pick and
 Carter 1994; Griffith and Mullen 2001; Carew
 and Florkowski 2003; and Glauben and Loy
 2003), automobile exports (e.g., Knetter 1989,
 1993; Marston 1990; Gagnon and Knetter
 1995), and in a wide range of other industries.1
 Most PTM studies, such as those listed
 above, use export unit values as the price vari-
 able.2 Export unit values are calculated as
 the ratio of value to volume of exports for
 a specific product category and destination
 country. Market- or customer-specific price in-
 formation is typically confidential, making ex-
 port unit values the next best alternative. The
 disadvantage of unit values is that they of-
 ten aggregate data on products employed for
 very different uses.3 Thus, findings of PTM that
 are attributed to price discrimination might
 ternatively indicate product differentiation
 when unit values are used (Sexton and Lavoie
 2001). It is important to understand the effect
 of unit value data on PTM testing because ev-
 idence, or lack of evidence, of PTM can be
 used for policy purposes (e.g., Carter 1993;
 Gil-Pareja 2003). Moreover, PTM can have
 important effects on the international trans-
 mission of monetary and fiscal policy, and
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 data.
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 can increase exchange rate volatility, relative
 to a situation where markets are integrated
 (Betts and Devereux 2000). The objective of
 our study is to examine the potential bias in
 pricing-to-market results when using unit val-
 ues aggregating differentiated products.
 Product differentiation has been explicitly
 modeled in studies evaluating the extent of
 exchange rate pass-through (e.g., Dornbush
 1987; Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter 1996;
 Yang 1997; Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston
 2002).4 In these studies, substitution occurs be-
 tween a good produced by the home firm and
 a good produced by the foreign firm. Our anal-
 ysis of product differentiation differs from the
 above studies in two respects. First, substitu-
 tion occurs between a set of vertically differ-
 entiated goods produced in the home country
 and sold to the home and a foreign market.
 Second, we specifically examine how product
 differentiation affects the test of PTM.
 The disadvantages of unit values are ac-
 knowledged in many PTM studies using Knet-
 ter's model. Common criticisms of unit val-
 ues are that they do not account for differ-
 ent qualities shipped to different markets and
 for changes in product quality over time (Gil
 Pareja 2002).5 However, authors, like Knet-
 ter (1989), typically argue that systematic dif-
 ferences in product quality, such as shipping
 different qualities to different markets, can
 be captured by country dummies. Similarly,
 changes in the quality of the product that is
 common across countries can be captured by
 time effects. Thus, the impact of product differ-
 entiation on the evaluation of PTM is typically
 argued to be minimal.6
 While prior authors acknowledge the prob-
 lems associated with unit values when they
 reflect different qualities shipped to different
 countries or across time, we address an is-
 sue that to our knowledge has not been stud-
 ied before in the PTM literature. Namely,
 we examine destination-specific changes in the
 product-quality mix and the false PTM findings
 that may result when unit values aggrega e dif-
 ferentiated products. False PTM findings occur
 because fluctuations in exchange rates cause
 a change i  the product-quality mix exported,
 which in turn affect the unit values. We demon-
 strat  that this relationship between exchange
 rate and unit values c n be mistake ly inter-
 preted as PTM in empir cal work. We also show
 that the magnitude of the bias in PTM results
 depends on the level of product differ n ia-
 tion.7
 To examine the incidence of spurious PTM
 results, we introduce a conceptual model
 where a monopolist sells vertically differenti-
 ated products to a domes ic and a foreign mar-
 ket. Two polar scenarios are analyzed. In the
 first one, there is perfect and costless consumer
 arbitrage, and the law of one price (LOP) holds
 for individual products (i.e., before aggrega-
 tion). In the second scenario, consumer ar-
 bitrage is not feasible and markets are seg-
 mented. In both scenarios, we find "pseudo
 PTM," i.e., PTM that is purely the result of data
 aggregation and product differentiation rather
 than price discrimination across markets. In
 the first scenario, there is pseudo PTM only.
 In the second scenario, there is "real PTM"
 as well because markets are segmented, and
 we show that the extent of pseudo PTM in-
 creases with the level of product differenti-
 atio .8 To evaluate the implication of these
 findings for empirical work, we employ Monte
 Carlo simulations analyzing the relationship
 between PTM and the level of product dif-
 erentiation. The results indicate the presence
 of pseudo PTM for a sufficiently high level of
 product differentiation when the LOP holds.
 In both scenarios, a higher level of product
 4 Exchange rate pass-through refers to the extent to which the
 price to a given importing country adjusts to changes in the ex-
 change rate.
 5 See also Alston, Carter, and Whitney (1992), and Goldberg
 and Knetter (1997) for discussions on the use of unit values in the
 evaluation of PTM. Abbott, Patterson, and Reca (1993) and Larue
 (2004) provide overviews of issues surrounding the specification of
 the PTM model in agri-food trade.
 6 More generally, Davis and Hewitt (1996) illustrate the prob-
 lem of using unit values in trade analysis when quality is important.
 They provide two definitions of aggregate quality and implement
 the procedure of Aw and Roberts (1986) in that context. The pro-
 cedure decomposes changes in unit values into a change in price
 and a change in average quality.
 7 Price stickiness and currency invoicing have also been indi-
 cated as potential reasons for bias in PTM findings (e.g., Gold-
 berg and Knetter 1997; Glauben and Loy 2003; Gervais and Larue
 2004). Other authors have raised the possibility of PTM findings
 due to quality differentiation without analyzing the problem per
 se. Gagnon and Knetter (1995) suggest that correlation between
 destination-specific quality and exchange rate changes may result
 in false detection of PTM. Hummels and Skiba (2004) examine
 empirically the Alchian-Allen conjecture-a per unit cost lowers
 the price of the high-quality good relative to that of the low-quality
 good thus raising the demand for the high-quality good (Borcher
 ding and Silberberg 1978)-using unit values. In doing so they ex-
 amine the alternative hypothesis that different prices to different
 markets could be due to imperfect competition and PTM rather
 than different qualities shipped to different markets under perfect
 competition. Their results are consistent with the Alchian-Allen
 conjecture and suggest that PTM alone cannot explain their find-
 ings, thus lending support to our theoretical work.
 8 This is in the same spirit as in Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston
 (2002), who find that higher product substitutability moderates
 exchange rate pass-through, using a model where an exporting firm
 and a foreign import-competing firm produce products of various
 substitutability.
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 differentiation is more likely to lead to a sta-
 tistically significant evidence of PTM.
 The rest of the article is organized as follows.
 First, we present the conceptual model and the
 analysis of the two scenarios. This is followed
 by a simulation study and the conclusion.
 The Model
 Consider two countries: country 1 and 2. A mo-
 nopolist in country 1 produces two vertically
 differentiated products with exogenous qual-
 ities qi and qh(O < ql < qh). The two goods
 are sold domestically and exported to country
 2. The marginal cost is i for the product of
 quality q(j- = , h).9
 We model vertical differentiation ia la Mussa
 and Rosen (1978). Consumers are heteroge-
 neous in their valuation of quality. The con-
 ditional indirect utility of a consumer with
 a marginal willingness to pay for quality
 of 0 and income y is given by y + Oq -
 p if she buys one unit of the product of quality
 q at price p, and y if she does not buy the dif-
 ferentiated product. There is a continuum of
 consumers with total mass of one distributed
 uniformly in each country. In other words,
 0 E U[0, Oi] with density 1/Oi in country
 i (i = 1, 2).
 Let Oil(i = 1, 2) denote the consumer in mar-
 ket i who is indifferent between buying the
 low-quality product or not buying the differen-
 tiated product. In other words, that consumer
 obtains the same level of indirect utility from
 either option. Thus, 0i1 is the value of 0 that
 solves y + Oq, - Xi - pil = y, where X, = 1 and
 X2 = e, and e is the exchange rate expressed in
 units of country 2's currency per unit of coun-
 try 1's currency.10 Similarly, Oih is the consumer
 in market i who is indifferent between buy-
 ing the low- or high-quality product, i.e., 0ih is
 the value of 0 that solves y + Oqh - Xi " Pih =
 y + Oql - 1i - pil with K1 = 1 and K2 = e. Thus,
 consumers with 0 E [0, Oi) will not buy the
 differentiated product, those with 0 e [Oil, Oih]
 will buy the low-quality product and the others
 (0 e (0ih, 0i]) will buy the high-quality prod-
 uct."11 Accordingly, the demand for each qual-
 ity is the length of the consumer interval buying
 the given quality multiplied by the density of
 consumers along that interval (1/0i) times the
 total number of consumers, N = 1. The de-
 man s for the ow- and high-quality products
 in country i = 1, 2 are
 Oih - Oil (1) dil(Pih, Pil) -
 Oi
 i1 (Pihql - Pilqh)
 Oi(qh - ql)ql
 0i - Oih (2) dih(Pih, Pil) =
 Oi
 Xi (Ph - PI)
 Oi (qh- q)
 When there is pricing-to-market, a firm with
 market power will set different prices (in the
 same currency) in different markets based on
 their respective market conditions. Accord-
 ingly, Marston (1990) examines PTM by form-
 ing the ratio of the export to the home price set
 by a domestic monopolist and evaluating how
 it varies with the exchange rate. Similarly, we
 use the domestic-export price ratio
 (3) X= 1 P2
 where Pi is the price in country i, expressed
 in country 1's currency.12 The PTM effect can
 be measured as the effect of a change in the
 exchange rate on X. When there is PTM, a
 change in the exchange rate will have a non-
 zero impact on the ratio X. In other words,
 there is PTM when a movement in the ex-
 change rate leads to disproportionate price
 changes in the two markets. In our theoreti-
 cal setting there is product differentiation, but
 it cannot be observed and product aggregates
 are taken to be homogeneous. Thus, in this set-
 ting, there is no PTM when X - 1. We use this
 latter definition in this article.13,14
 9 When marginal cost is linear in quality, it can be shown that
 only the high-quality product will be sold.
 10 Throughout this article, prices are expressed in country l's cur-
 rency.
 " This demand structure requires that 0 < Oil i 5ih < Oi, which
 holds in equilibrium.
 12 Other studies using this measure include Bergin and Feenstra
 (2001) and Gervais and Larue (2004).
 13 A reviewer correctly points out that it is the change in the price
 ratio X in response to a change in the exchange rate, holding qual-
 ity composition constant (if this could be done or observed), that
 provides evidence of PTM. We do not use this more general defini-
 tion because our objective is to show that not taking into account
 product differentiation may lead to false PTM results. The implicit
 assumption that product differentiation cannot be observed is con-
 sistent with the use of unit values in the empirical PTM literature.
 14 Our results also hold using the more general definition of PTM,
 i.e., changes in exchange rates have a nonzero impact on the ratio
 X. Some results in this case can only be demonstrated numerically,
 which is not as appealing. Furthermore, we can also show that
 our results hold in the presence of transaction costs. However, we
 assume that transaction costs are zero for simplicity.
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 We consider two scenarios. In the first one,
 the LOP holds for each individual product, and
 the prices of each product in the two markets
 are equal in the same currency. In the other
 scenario, markets are segmented and arbitrage
 between consumers across countries is not fea-
 sible. Consequently, each product is sold by the
 monopolist at different prices in each country.
 Analysis
 In this section, we solve for the equilibrium
 prices and quantities in each scenario. The mo-
 nopolist's objective is to maximize profit by
 choosing prices. Using equilibrium prices and
 quantities, we calculate the unit values of sales
 to each country, expressed in country 1's cur-
 rency. Unit values then enter the domestic-
 export price ratio (X), which is used to deter-
 mine the presence of PTM. We begin with the
 first scenario where the law of one price (LOP)
 holds for each product.
 Scenario 1. LOP Holds The monopolist can-
 not price discriminate between markets 1 and
 2 in this scenario. Thus pit = Pi and Pih = Ph(i =
 1, 2), and profit is maximized according to:
 maxpPh ( q-2 (dl +d2l) P1 Ph 2
 + (Ph- q) (d1h +d2h)
 where dil(Pl, Ph) and dih(P1, Ph) are the demand
 functions for the low- and high-quality product
 in country i (i = 1, 2) as derived in the previ-
 ous section. Note that the prices pl and Ph are
 set by the monopolist in country 1's currency,
 whereas consumers' demand in market 2 is a
 function of the price in the local currency, i.e.,
 Pl - e and Ph - e, where e is the exchange rate.15
 From the first-order conditions, we obtain
 the equilibrium prices p7 and p* and the equi-
 librium quantities di and d*h for market i (i =
 1, 2).16 The unit value Pi is computed as the
 weighted average price in market i, i.e.,
 (5) Pi = pd + pdh
 di i difh
 The presence of PTM is determined by
 computing X = L and evaluating whether it
 is identically equal to one or varies with the
 exchange rate. Our results are summarized in
 the next proposition.
 PROPOSITION 1. When the LOP holds for
 individual products, there is pseudo PTM when
 using unit values.
 Proof: We begin with the premise that
 there is no PTM when X = -I 1. Substi-
 P2 -
 tuting equation (5) into equation (3), the
 domestic-export price ratio can be expressed
 as
 (6) X-= p7U1 + p(1 - a1) pI;2 + Ph(l - o2)
 where ,i = di (i = 1, 2), is the fraction of
 low-quality product in country i.
 For X = 1, it must be that aO = U2. Substitut-
 ing the equilibrium quantities (see Lavoie and
 Liu 2006), we have
 qh(02 + e01)
 4e2 q1(02 + e01)
 and
 qhe(02 ? e01)
 (8) 2 = 4 eq(02+e0)
 It follows that 02 = e01 is required for ua =
 92. Given that 01 and 02 are fixed parameters,
 91 = U2 cannot hold when e varies. Thus, X =
 1 does not hold, indicating PTM. We find false
 evidence of PTM (pseudo PTM) using unit
 values.
 Pseudo PTM is found because the exchange
 rate affects the ratio of unit values through a
 change in the product-quality mix. An appre-
 ciation of the foreign currency (decrease in e)
 results in an increase in imports of the high-
 quality variety in country 2 relative to the total
 quantity of imports. The reverse is true for a
 depreciation of the foreign currency.
 The shift in the product-quality mix occurs
 because fluctuations in the exchange rate af-
 fect the relative demand for the high-quality
 variety in market 2. To illustrate, note that
 d2h ql[h2(qh - q1) - e(ph - Pl)]
 (9)  d21 e(phql - Plqh)
 15 For both scenarios, it can be easily shown that the monopolist is
 better off supplying both products than supplying either product.
 16 See Lavoie and Liu (2006) for the derivations of the equilibrium
 prices and quantities.
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 and the derivative with respect to the exchange
 rate is
 ( (d2h/d21) qOz(qh - ql) (10) . ae e2(phql - Plqh )
 When P> L- a necessary condition that is
 always satisfied in equilibrium for the demand
 of both goods to be positive-this derivative
 is negative. In other words, even though both
 goods face the same change in the exchange
 rate, a decrease in exchange rate decreases the
 relative price of the high-quality good, which
 results in a shift in product-quality mix toward
 the higher quality product, i.e., quality upgrad-
 ing.17 For consumers, a currency appreciation
 translates into an increase in income. With
 more income, quality upgrading implies that
 consumption of the two varieties does not in-
 crease proportionally, i.e., preferences are non-
 homothetic. Any other ad valorem costs (e.g.,
 tariffs and taxes) would have the same effect
 in the context of nonhomothetic preferences
 (Das and Donnenfeld 1987; Donnenfeld 1988;
 Wall 1992; and Krishna 1992). There is sub-
 stantial support for preferences of this type in
 the empirical literature. For example, Deaton
 and Muellbauer (1983) have shown that food
 accounts for a much larger budget share of low-
 income households. While the quantity of food
 consumed does not generally increase when in-
 come increases, the quality of food purchased
 often does. For example, more expensive cuts
 of steak, and brand name as opposed to generic
 products are bought. The same could be said
 of cars, i.e., with more income people generally
 tend to buy more expensive cars, not more cars.
 We argue that it is this mechanism that oper-
 ates when false PTM results are obtained. Note
 that all consumers are assumed to have nonho-
 mothetic preferences in this model. However,
 in practice, having only some consumers with
 nonhomothetic preferences is sufficient to ob-
 tain some quality upgrading and therefore, the
 observation of pseudo PTM.
 The empirical trade literature provides more
 support for the assumption of nonhomoth-
 eticity of preferences. Hunter and Markusen
 (1988) reject the homotheticity of prefer-
 ences using a linear expenditure system for 11
 commodities in 34 countries. Using the same
 approach, Hunter (1991) estimates that non-
 homothetic preferences may account for more
 than one quarter of interindustry trade flows.
 There is also empirical evidence of quality
 upgrading or downgrading following move-
 ments in ad valorem costs. Conle  and Peter-
 son (1995) find evidence for a decrease in qual-
 ity of U.S. export of beef products to Japan
 following a depreciation of yen in the 1980s.
 Hummels and Skiba (2004) show that lower
 ad valorem tariffs and igher transportation
 cost result in quality upgrading using export
 data for more than 5,000 product categories.
 Goolsbee (2004), in an empirical study of the
 effect of ad valorem tax subsidies, finds that
 all of the increase in investment comes from
 an upgrade in the quality of the capital pur-
 chased. The empirical evidence listed here sug-
 gests that quality upgrading/downgrading is an
important concern for PTM studies using com-
 modity aggregates.
 The quality upgrading/downgrading reason-
 ing applies to many consumer products and
 also applies to intermediate goods, such as
 some agricultural products. The extent to
 which the substitution occurs for intermedi-
ate goods depends on the production pro-
 cess. There are at least two situations where
 the quality upgrading/downgrading argument
 holds for intermediate goods. First, higher
 quality inputs may lead to higher quality out-
 p t that can be sold at higher prices. For ex-
 ample, a decrease in the price of organic soy-
 beans relative to the price of conventional soy-
 beans could result in a shift in production to-
wards more organic soybean products that can
be sold at a premium. Second, higher qual-
 ity inputs may lead to a decrease in process-
 ing costs. For example, cleaner wheat results
 in lower flour processing costs without chang-
 ing the quality of the end product. Processing
 costs can also be reduced by altering the blend
 of inputs. For example, wheat is blended for
 protein according to the type of bread flour
 desired. Many wheat importing countries tend
 to blend their own wheat, which is usually low
 i  protein, with imported wheat of higher pro-
 tein content. A favorable movement in the ex-
 change rate would result in substitution to-
 wards higher protein wheat because not as
 much imported wheat is necessary to bring up
 the flour protein level to the right level.
 When these conditions hold, or when the
 substitution happens after a certain threshold
 change in exchange rate, false PTM results oc-
 cur for intermediate goods. Note also that if the
 17 This result is akin to the Alchian-Allen theorem (see footnote
 7), which has motivated the literature on trade restraints and qual-
 ity upgrading (e.g., Falvey 1979; Aw and Robert 1986; Feenstra
 1988). Feenstra (1995) notes that quality upgrading "can refer to
 either a shift in demand towards higher priced import varieties (i.e.,
 a change in product mix), or to the addition of improved charac-
 teristics on each variety" (p. 1572).
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 substitution does not occur for certain firms, in
 practice it may be present at the country level.
 Thus, while there are some limitations to our
 model in the context of intermediate goods,
 our results still draw attention to the fact that
 false PTM results are a concern when data for
 commodity aggregates are used.
 Remark Under perfect competition, where
 exportprices are equal to marginal cost, we also
 find pseudo PTM using unit values.
 The intuition for this remark is the same as
 presented for proposition 1. This result is par-
 ticularly important given that PTM results are
 typically interpreted as evidence of imperfect
 competition (Goldberg and Knetter 1997).
 Scenario 2. Market Segmentation In this sce-
 nario, the monopolist price discriminates be-
 tween markets. Each market can be treated
 independently because of the assumption of
 constant marginal cost with respect to quantity.
 The monopolist maximizes profit by setting the
 price pij to country i (i = 1, 2) for product of
 quality qj (j= 1, h) according to:
 / 21 9 d 1+2 (11) max pil - Pih -- dih
 for market i (i = 1, 2), where dil(Pl, Ph) and
 dih(pl, Ph) are the demand functions for the
 low- and high-quality product in country i as
 derived earlier.
 Define Xt as the domestic-export price ratio
 for the low-quality product (i.e., p*l/P~1) and
 Xh, as that for the high-quality product (i.e.,
 P*h P2h). A ratio different from one or vary-
 ing with exchange rates indicates that the mo-
 nopolist price discriminates. Thus, there is real
 PTM when Xt = 1 or Xh - 1 does not hold.
 The next proposition summarizes our findings
 for this scenario.
 PROPOSITION 2. When markets are seg-
 mented, (i) There is real PTM for each individ-
 ual product. (ii) There are both real and pseudo
 PTM when using unit values.
 Proof: (i) Substituting the expressions for
 the equilibrium prices (see scenario 2 in Lavoie
 and Liu [2006]), the domestic-export price ra-
 tios can be expressed as
 (201 + qi)e (12) X+
 202 + eqi
 and
 (201 + qh)e (13) Xh =  202 + eqh
 For XI = Xh = 1, it must be that 02 = e01.
 Given that 01 and 02 are fixed parameters,
 02 = e01 cannot hold when e varies. Thus,
 Xi 1 and Xh - 1 do not hold, indicating PTM.
 We label this result "real PTM" given that the
 non-aggregated prices used in this calculation
 are set by a discriminatory monopolist.
 (ii) Because the two markets are indepen-
 dent, fluctuations in the exchange rates affect
 only the equilibrium prices and quantities in
 market 2. Thus, a change in the exchange rate
 would affect the domestic-export price ratio
 (X = 1) only through P2, which can be ex-
 pressed as P2 I- P1 + x1 X1 Xh It follows that
 (14) 2 Io2 P11 P1h) XT P1t ae ae Xt Xh ae X2"2
 aXhPh (1 2) < 0
 ae X2
 A change in the exchange rate affects P2
 through (1) a change in the composition of
 imports (U2) generating the pseudo PTM ef-
 fect, and (2) a change in Xi and Xh, which
 reflect real PTM. The negative sign of the
 derivative follows from: a2 - 2qh2 > 0,
 -e - (202-eqj)2 (P* PM) p*_P <. a x, -X 202(20, +qi)
 S Xh - I - Ph < , - (202+eq)2
 0,I -= (202+eqh)2> 0, and (1 - 2) > 0. Thus,
 ax > 0 (because aP = 0, P2 < 0) due to bothae ae e
 real and pseudo PTM.
 As with scenario 1, a change in the exchange
 rate affects the composition of imports. This
 effect does not matter when exa ining PTM
 using individual product prices. However, be-
 cause unit values constitute a weighted aver-
 age of the price of high- and lo -quality good
 in each market, a change in the exchange rate
 not only affects the landed prices in country 2,
 but also the weights associated to those prices
 through a change in the product-quality mix
imported. Thus, PTM findings are the result
of two effects: (1) a true PTM effect, because
 the monopolist does price discriminate in this
 scenario, and (2) a pseudo PTM due to t e
 use of unit values, which average the price of
 good h and 1, and the resulting change in the
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 composition of imports following fluctuations
 in the exchange rate.
 This result indicates that one would con-
 clude correctly that there is PTM using unit
 values as prices. However, there is also pseudo
 PTM. The extent to which X departs from one
 is affected by the aggregation of differentiated
 products, i.e., the importance of pseudo PTM.
 In what follows, we examine the relationship
 between the level of product differentiation
 and the extent of pseudo PTM for both scenar-
 ios. Increasing levels of product differentiation
 is modeled by fixing qi and increasing qh. The
 next two corollaries summarize our results.18
 COROLLARY 3. Under the LOP, the extent of
 pseudo PTM increases with the level ofproduct
 differentiation.
 Proof: Under the LOP, PTM findings us-
 ing unit values represent solely pseudo PTM.
 Thus, let IX - 11 measure the extent of pseudo
 PTM. The extent of pseudo PTM increases
 with product differentiation if IX - 11 increases
 with qh. To show that, we need to show that if
 X - 1 > O0, then x > 0, and if X - 1 < 0, then
 ax < O. In Lavoie and Liu (2006) we show that aqh
 when 02< eO1,X - 1 > 0, and > O0. When
 02 >e01, X - 1 < , and x < 0.
 COROLLARY 4. Under market segmentation,
 the extent of pseudo PTM increases with the
 level of product differentiation.
 Proof: Recall that X =- P, Xh Ph and P21 P2h
 X = Pr+Ph(1--l Under market segmenta-
 P i*r2+ P2 h (-2) tion (scenario 2), findings of PTM using unit
 values represent both real and pseudo PTM.
 Let IX - Xhl and IX - XI1 together measure
 the extent of pseudo PTM in this scenario. The
 extent of pseudo PTM increases with product
 differentiation if IX - Xjl (j = h, 1) increases
 1.7
 1.6
 PTMs
 1.5
 1.4
 1.4 . .... .... .-.. . -... . .." - - -- -- . 0 3 0.4 0 5 0.6 0.7
 Legend qh
 x
 ****** XI
 ......... - h
 Figure 1. Domestic-export price ratios and
 product differentiation
 with qh. To show that, we need to show that if
 X - Xi > 0 then a(x-x) > 0, and if X - Xj <
 0 then (x-xj) < 0. We divide this proof into aqh
 two cases.
 Case 1. 02 < e01. Note that when
 qh = qI, X1 = Xh = X > 1. More-
 over, x = 0, i< 0, limqh00Xh = 1, and
 ax > 0.19 This implies that when qh >
 qj, X- Xj > 0 and I(x-xj) > 0(j h,l). See
 Lavoie and Liu (2006) for the derivations.
 Case 2. 02 > e01. When qh =
 qi, Xi = Xh = X < 1. Moreover,
 q= 0, ? > 0, limqho, Xh = 1, and ax <0.20 This implies that when qh >
 qt, X- Xj < 0 and (x-x) <0(j = h, 1). See Lavoie and Liu (2006) for the derivations.
 To get a sense of how X, Xi, and Xh vary
 with the level of product differentiation (qh),
 we take scenario 2's model, assign parameter
 values, and plot these three measures against
 qh. We set qi = 0.3, 01 = 1, 02 = 2, e = 3 (02 <
 e01). The results are provided in Fig. 1.
 As indicated in the second case of corollary
 4, when qh = q1, XI = Xh = X > 1, indicating
 PTM but no pseudo PTM. With differentiated
 products (qh >q1), there is pseudo PTM be-
 cause X is different from Xh and Xi. Moreover,
 18 Our setting assumes that quality is exogenous. Alternatively,
 quality can be endogenous and the monopolist chooses qualities
 followed by prices. The qualitative results do not change, i.e., there
 is always pseudo PTM. If a change in the exchange rate does not
 induce a change in the qualities (e.g., the change is perceived to be
 temporary and quality adjustments are costly, as in the short run),
 qualities are fixed once chosen. Because our findings of pseudo
 PTM holds for any qh > q, > 0, endogenous qualities do not im-
 prove the model. If qualities adjust automatically with a change in
 the exchange rate (say in the long run), we also find pseudo PTM.
 One important disadvantage of the endogenous quality model will
 become obvious with corollaries 3 and 4--it does not allow us to
 determine how product differentiation affects the extent of pseudo
 PTM. This outcome of our model is important because in the con-
 struction of unit values, aggregation is performed over products
 that are more differentiated in some industries than in others.
 19 As product differentiation increases, Xh decreases but never
 actually reaches a value of 1 because negative quantities of either
 variety are not allowed. Thus, Xh > 1 and X > Xi > Xh > 1.
 2() As product differentiation increases, Xh increases but never
 actually reaches a value of 1 because negative quantities of either
 variety are not allowed. Thus, Xh < 1 and X < Xi < Xh < 1.
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 the graph clearly shows the increasing impor-
 tance of pseudo PTM with greater levels of
 product differentiation because X moves away
 from both X1 and Xh when qh increases.21
 Simulations
 Our theoretical results indicate that when sales
 to a given market involve differentiated prod-
 ucts and unit values are used as prices to eval-
 uate PTM, there is always pseudo PTM. This
 result applies with or without price discrimina-
 tion and even under perfect competition. This
 implies that in regression analyses following
 Knetter (1989), the exchange rate coefficient
 may pick up the effects of pseudo PTM. Next
 we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to in-
 vestigate: (1) how prevalent are false statisti-
 cal findings of PTM, and (2) quantify how the
 level of product differentiation impacts statis-
 tical findings of PTM.
 We estimate the following model,
 (15) In Xt = o+ 1 In e, + u, t = 1,..., T
 where T is the number of draws, et - U[a, b] is
 the exchange rate for draw t, and ut is the er-
 ror term. Xt is the domestic-export price ratio
 generated as PI+E', where Pi is the unit value
 for market i (i = 1,2) computed as described in
 each scenario of the previous section, and Eit "-
 N(0, 82) and are identically and independently
 distributed across i and t.
 If there is no PTM, the domestic-export
 price ratio should be independent of the ex-
 change rate and P1 should be zero. By analyz-
 ing the estimate of p3 under different levels of
 product differentiation, we can evaluate the ef-
 fect of product differentiation on pseudo PTM.
 We estimate the above model under
 the two scenarios examined in the pre-
 vious section. For both scenarios, we set
 a = 1.5, b = 2.5, 8 = 1/15, T = 100 (the number
 of draws), Oi = 1, 02 = 2, and q, = 0.3.22 We
 conduct 1,000 trials for each level of product
 differentiation (qh) to obtain I1 and its p-value.
 Table 1. 1i under the LOP Scenario
 Percentage of
 Number of Mean of Trials with
 qh Trials 01 p-value < 10%
 0.4 1,000 0.1717 12.5%
 0.5 1,000 0.3975 42.8%
 0.6 1,000 0.6218 85.6%
 0.7 1,000 0.8841 99.6%
 Table 2. Pr1 under the Market Segmentation
 Scenario
 Percentage of
 Number Mean of Trials with
 qh of Trials p1 p-value < 10%
 0.4 1,000 1.0328 90.6%
 0.5 1,000 1.0702 99.3%
 0.6 1,000 1.1361 100%
 0.7 1,000 1.2267 100%
 The means of I1 and the percentages of trials
 with p-value less than 10% are provided in ta-
 bles 1 and 2.
 Table 1 is consistent with our theoretical re-
 sults and indicates that when products are suf-
 ficiently differentiated, statistically significant
 results suggesting PTM may be obtained, al-
 though there is no real PTM. We obtain false
 evidence of PTM with over 42% of our trials
 when qh = 0.5 and almost 100% of the tri-
 als when qh = 0.7. Table 2 reflects scenario
 2 where there is both real and pseudo PTM.
 For all levels of product differentiation, the
 significance level (1 - p-value) is higher than
 in the first scenario. This is intuitive given that
 there is pseudo as well as real PTM in this case.
 Both tables indicate that that the PTM elastic-
 ity (p1) increases with product differentiation,
 and so does the proportion of statistical PTM
 findings-a result consistent with corollaries 3
 and 4.23
 Conclusion
 In this study, we examine the extent to which
 a false detection of pricing-to-market (pseudo
 PTM) may arise from the use of unit value
 data. To do so, we analyze two scenarios.
 Both scenarios involve a monopolist located
 21 In the process of proving corollary 4, we also showed that when
 there is both real and pseudo PTM, product differentiation exag-
 gerates the real level of price dispersion, i.e., the extent to which
 the prices to the two markets differ. The more X, Xh, and Xi di-
 verge from 1 (in a positive or negative fashion), the greater the
 price dispersion. When 02 < e01 and qh > ql, X > X1 > Xh > 1,
 and X shows a greater price dispersion than is demonstrated by
 either Xh or Xt. When 02 > e01 and qh > ql, X < XI < Xh < 1, and
 X again shows a greater price dispersion than is demonstrated by
 either Xh or Xi.
 22 The parameters are chosen to ensure that all equilibrium prices
 and demands are nonnegative. Moreover, Pi + Eit must be positive
 to calculate In Xt, and 8 is chosen accordingly.
 23 We can verify numerically using our theoretical results that
 alnX increases with qh.
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 in the home country producing a low- and
 high-quality variety of a good. In the first sce-
 nario, arbitrage prevails and the monopolist
 sets the same price to both markets for a given
 variety. In the second scenario, arbitrage is
 not possible and the monopolist price discrim-
 inates between the two markets. Pseudo PTM
 is found in both scenarios. Findings of PTM
 when the law of one price (LOP) holds are
 purely spurious, whereas they represent a com-
 bination of real and pseudo PTM when mar-
 kets are segmented. Moreover, pseudo PTM is
 found even under perfect competition. Pseudo
 PTM occurs because movements in the ex-
 change rate alter the product-quality mix sold
 to each market thus affecting the unit values,
 even when the prices to the two markets are
 identical by variety.
 For both scenarios, we demonstrate that
 product differentiation increases the extent to
 which results are biased by pseudo PTM, thus
 increasing the likelihood of false detection of
 PTM in empirical work. Our simulation results
 show that for sufficiently differentiated prod-
 ucts, a statistical finding of PTM occurs when
 the LOP holds. Moreover, the PTM elasticity
 increases with product differentiation in both
 scenarios.
 Our study is limited by the occurrence of
 changes in the product-quality mix following
 fluctuations in exchange rates. This argument
 relies on the nonhomotheticity of consumer
 preferences embodied in the Mussa and Rosen
 (1978) model of vertical differentiation. There
 is ample support for the assumption of nonho-
 mothetic preferences in the literature and our
 results do not rest on this assumption holding
 true for all consumers. In practice, having some
 consumers with nonhomothetic preferences
 is sufficient to generate pseudo PTM result.
 Moreover, our model describes demand for
 consumer goods, which encompasses numer-
 ous goods examined in previous PTM studies,
 notably automobiles. The applicability of our
 model to intermediate goods, such as several
 agricultural commodities, also relies on the ex-
 tent to which quality upgrading/downgrading
 occurs. We presented two conditions under
 which quality substitution occurs for inputs.
 Those conditions can be argued to hold for
 many agricultural inputs, at least at the coun-
 try demand level and for threshold levels of
 exchange rate change. Even with these limi-
 tations, our study draws attention to and for-
 malizes the link between pseudo PTM and the
 use of unit value when products are differen-
 tiated, and more importantly explains how the
 level of product differentiation is related to the
 magnitude of the pseudo PTM problem.
 While other potential reasons have been
 rai ed fo  bias in PTM findings (e.g., currency
 invoicing and menu costs), our results sug-
 gest that the prevalence of PTM findings in
 the literature could also be attributed to the
 use of unit values aggregating differentiated
 products. PTM findings have been interpreted
 as evidence of price discrimination and mar-
 ket power, without explaining the source of
 market segmentation or market power (see
 Goldberg and Knetter [1997] for a discussion).
 Sexton and Lavoie (2001) also observe the gen-
 eral lack of justification for the examination
 of imperfect competition and price discrimi-
 nation among PTM studies focusing on food
 and agricultural products. Thus, while we do
 not dismiss the possibility of strategic pricing,
 our research emphasizes the need for future
 PTM studies to (1) investigate the plausibil-
 ity of market power in international trade of
 the product of interest, (2) evaluate the level
 of differentiation present in the export unit
 value data for the product category chosen,
 and (3) interpret the results accordingly. More
 confidence can be placed on results obtained
 using disaggregated data for which there are
 good reasons to believe exporters have mar-
 ket power in the international market (i.e.,
 hey produce a differentiated product relative
 to other countries' products, exports are con-
 ducted by a large entity, such as a state-trading
 firm, the exporter has a large world market
 share, etc.).2 Such caution is especially impor-
 tant when results are used for policy purposes.
 Alternatively, other approaches may be more
 suitable to test for imperfect competition and
 price discrimination when differentiated prod-
 ucts are exported. Examples of such methods
 include Verboven (1996), Goldberg and Knet-
 ter (1999), and Lavoie (2005).
 Future research includes finding ways to mit-
 igate pseudo PTM (e.g., by controlling for qual-
 ity changes), providing empirical evidence of
 false PTM by comparing results obtained us-
 ing data at different levels of product aggre-
 gation, and exploring further the link between
 unit values and pseudo PTM in the context of
 intermediate goods.
 [Received August 2005;
 accepted January 2006.]
 24 See for example Gil-Pareja (2002), and Glauben and Loy
 (2003) where such care is taken.
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